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STRATEGIC PLANNING, IMPACT ASSESSMENT, AND
TECHNICAL AID: THE SOUSS-MASSA INTEGRATED
WATER MANAGEMENT PROJECT
John E. Keith and Said Ouattar

ABSTRACT

Integrated river-basin management requires several basic conditions. Among
these are clear communications among all the actors involved in managing the basin's
water resources, one or more sets of data which are shared by all decision-makers, and
tools by which the decision-makers can evaluate policies (impact assessment).
Developing integrated management in conjunction with the creation of River Basin
Agencies is the objective of the USAID-sponsored Souss-Massa Integrated Water
Management (SIWM) project. The project activities have been designed to develop and
support communications, data sharing and model building within the institutions in the
Souss-Massa Basin as a demonstration for all Moroccan river basins.

STRATEGIC PLANNING, IMPACT ASSESSMENT, AND
TECHNICAL AID: THE SOUSS-MASSA INTEGRATED
WATER MANAGEMENT PROJECT*

Introduction 1
The Souss-Massa River Basin, which is bounded on the north by the High Atlas
Mountains and on the south and east by the Anti-Atlas Mountains, covers approximately
27,000 square kilometers. With a year-round growing season, irrigated agriculture in the
river basin produces more than half of Morocco's exported citrus and vegetables.
Surface water is collected and stored behind seven dams that have a combined total
capacity of approximately 1,608 million cubic meters. Groundwater is obtained primarily
from the Souss Valley alluvial aquifer. The reported recharge rate is approximately 450
million cubic meters annually, an amount that varies significantly in response to rainfall.
The total water use in the Basin is approximately 965 million cubic meters per
year. Overall, demand for water exceeds the sustainable supply, with the deficit being
made up by mining groundwater. Over-pumping of the alluvial aquifer exceeds an
average of 260 millions cubic meters per year, which has resulted in water level declines
ranging from 0.5 to 2.5 meters per year during the past three decades. Approximately
94% of the water resources in the Souss-Massa Basin are used for irrigation as compared
to approximately 85% to 90% for all of Morocco (Direction Generale Hydraulique du
Maroc, 1999). The remaining 5% to 6% are used for public and industrial supply. The
major areas of irrigation are restricted to the Massa and the Souss Valleys. Some of the
most intensive irrigation is centered near the Guerdane area, approximately 50 Ian west
of Agadir in the Taroudant area near the Souss River.

*The material for this paper was drawn from the Souss-Massa Integrated Water Management
Project, managed by Development Alternatives Incorporated (DAI), Bethesda, Maryland, and funded by
the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). The authors wish to thank both for
their comments and support; any errors are solely the authors' responsibility. Opinions expressed are those
of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views ofDAI or USAID.
IThe discussion in the introduction is taken in large part from Kent and Ouattar, undated.
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Water rights established before1914 were traditionally held by communities for
irrigation and potable water. During the French colonial period, water ownership by the
state was recognized, and intensive irrigation began. Following independence in 1952,
the Government of Morocco continued to view irrigation development as crucial to the
economy and encouraged new developments. Since 1960, the Souss-Massa basin has
become the major Moroccan exporter of fruits (50%) and vegetables (45%), in an
economy in which agriculture provides 18% of the GDP and 40% of the employment.
The Souss-Massa is fortunate to have a climate which permits year-round production and
growing seasons which offer good access to foreign markets. In addition, the SoussMassa basin, and Agadir, in particular, has become an international tourist destination.
Water use by large hotels and other recreational facilities, such as golf courses, is large
and sure to increase. However, the responsibility for water management has been
fragmented at best. A significant part of the problem of over-consumption is institutional
and involves the lack of coordinated planning and policy among the various water
managers and consumers. It is this planning and policy making on which this paper will
focus.
The Institutional Context
Prior to the passage of the new water law in 1995 (Law 10-95), responsibility for
various aspects of water management rested in several agencies. The primary decisionmaking occurred at the national levels. In general, important policy decisions were made
in Rabat. The regional administrations essentially carried out national policy, with
limited discretion.
The Direction Regionale Hydraulique (DRH), under the Ministry of Public Works
(Ministre d'Equipement), essentially managed surface water supplies, planning and
constructing dams, regulating releases and flows, managing flood control and providing
water (wholesaling) to other agencies.
The Ministry of Agriculture, through the regional Offices Regionales de la Mise
en Valeur de l' Agriculture (ORMVA), was provided surface flows from storage by the
DRH, and in tum allocated water (with a minimal price) to the various associations and
individual farmers . ORMVA's goal was to expand irrigation, modernize it, and assure
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that agriculture would continue to provide an economic engine for Morocco, and for the
Souss-Massa. ORMVA used new wells to augment its surface water supply as irrigated
perimeters were created and intensive irrigation expanded.
The Offices Nationales d'Eau Potable (ONEP) furnished potable water, both in
the rural areas and in larger cities, using the same water sources. In addition, the very
large cities had quasi-private metropolitan water offices which received water from
ONEP and provide it to end users (for example, the Regie Autonome Multi-Services,
Agadir - RAMSA). As the cities expanded, both ONEP and RAMSA expanded their
groundwater resources (as well as benefiting from new DRH storage facilities).
Authorization for drilling wells and using groundwater emanated from ORMVA, and the
DRH. Moreover, water quality issues, when even considered, were the responsibility of
the potable water agency, but came under at least the monitoring auspices of the Ministry
of Environment.
Thus, decisions regarding water use and development were primarily singlefocus. DRH targeted the management of surface water resources and facilities, ORMVA
looked toward expansion of irrigation, ONEP was occupied with the growth of urban and
rural potable water needs, and so on. The lines of communications were mainly up and
down the chain of command of each Ministry and agency, with little horizontal (interagency) exchange.
In addition, the planning and management of water resources in Morocco has
been, for the most part, highly centralized. For example, water prices for irrigation were
set in Rabat, and vary only slightly among the various river basins, irrespective of water
scarcity. Management plans (Plans Directeur, such as found in Conseil Superieur de
I'Eau et du Climat, 2000; Ministere de l'Interieur, undated) for all the regional agencies
were (and are) developed at the central level, albeit with considerable cross-agency input
at that level. Even now, few regional agencies seem inclined or perhaps even willing to
discuss modifications of those Plans Directeur without national approval. There was
little inter-agency communication regarding policy at the regional level, and probably not
much more between the regional and national arms of a given agency.
For over 30 years, the Moroccan government (GOM) emphasized the need to
develop Morocco's water resources. In 1967, a national goal was established to have one

4
million hectares of land under irrigation before the year 2000. In 1986, the government
established a goal to build one dam per year. These goals were both consistent with
Morocco's long term water management strategy of "Not one Drop to the Sea" (World
Bank, 1995). Given that Morocco in general, and the Souss-Massa in particular, face
limited and exhaustible ground water supplies in an area with highly variable surface
water resources, the results of the emphasis on growth coupled with the institutional
"tunnel vision" were predictable. Augmented surface water supplies could not keep up
with demand, pumping increased and the water table fell rapidly in many places.
Management prerogatives and politics ensured that the problems of regional integrated
conjunctive use and water quality were not going to be solved by one agency acting
alone.
Annual declines in the aquifer in the Guerdane area reflect the intensity of
farming and pumping (Figure 1). By 2010, groundwater levels may be sufficiently deep
to make pumping uneconomical in many locations.
It became clear that important changes had to occur. First, emphasis on water

management for optimum benefits replaced the expansion of demand as a guiding
principle (Conseil Superieur de l'eau, 2000). Next, water managers had to have a broader
perspective to plan for the maximum sustainable production from the renewable and nonrenewable water resources. Finally, local water problems had to be met with local
solutions and with flexibility. With these goals in mind, the new water law was passed in
1995.
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Relative evolution of the aquifer level drop (m) at Guerdane location
(1970 to 2000)
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Figure 1. Aquifer levels at Guerdane region

The 1995 water law in Morocco (Law 10-95) has those two major targets in mind.
The Law created Agences de bassin Hydraulique (AbH) [or River Basin Agencies RBAs] which have a broad mandate for managing the water resources, both surface and
ground. Within the new law, well authorizations, allocations of surface water, water
quality monitoring and management, and several other aspects of water management
were vested in the new AbHs. However, budgets for these agencies were based on the
previous DRHs, and resources to manage the broader mandate are very limited. Even
though these agencies are expected to be self-sustaining in the longer term, the short run
water management problems are still a function of differing - and competing - demands
and objectives. For that reason alone, regionalization of decision-making within and
among the various agencies with roles to play in water management became an objective
of the GOM.
The SIWM Project
After the passage of Law 10-95, the Government of Morocco enlisted the support
of the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), among others, for the

0
0
0
N
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development ofRBA capacity for integrated water management. Since the Souss-Massa
basin is both critical to the regional and national economy, and one of the most watershort regions in Morocco, it was chosen as the demonstration basin for the new RBAs.
The premise of the Souss-Massa Integrated Water Management (SIWM) project,
funded by USAID and managed by Development Alternatives, Inc., of Bethesda, Md., is
that a healthy, functioning Agency with a broad perspective is necessary for good water
management. None-the-Iess, a functioning agency with an integrated approach (ground
water, surface water, and water quality) is not a sufficient condition for good water
management. The various regional "partners" in managing the local water resources
must be involved with decision-making and planning. But simply having the various
agencies communicate will not assure integrated management. Tools must be in place
through which the various agencies can analyze alternative courses of action under
various external constraints. Thus, SIWM's approach is to support the institutional
development of the RBA, encourage inter-agency communications at many levels and
provide a set of tools by which the partners can make appropriate local policy. The
specific objectives of the SIWM project are:
•

Strengthening the capacity of the RBA to implement Law 10-95

•

Establish intra- and inter-institutional mechanisms for collaboration

•

Establish sustainable financing mechanisms for the RBA

•

Create effective and transparent communications systems for all stakeholders

•

Provide management tools and focused training programs for stakeholder
institutions

•

Establish baselines and monitoring systems

•

Ensure stakeholder participation in water management, and

•

Help Morocco establish appropriate water policy

Beginning in 2000, the SIWM project identified several activities which appeared to
be critical to developing regional integrated decision-making. The first activity
(Component 1) was related to planning and support of the development of the RBA and a
process of cooperative water management. The second activity (Component 2) involved
implementing a set of "pilot projects" demonstrating "best practices" in water
management, from which both water managers and water users could benefit. The third
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activity (Component 3) involved including NGOs, such as water user associations and
communes, in local water management. In 2002, a fourth activity was added to the
SIWM project. In recognition of the importance of the coastal areas, both economically
and environmentally, the first steps toward integration of coastal zone issues into the
planning for the Souss-Massa river basin were begun.
SIWM's activities, then, are quite diverse. They involve institutional support for the
Agencies and for strategic planning, but also include such pilot projects as the installation
of telemetry capability in the three agencies charged with wholesale (gross) water
distribution, installation of GIS stations and associated training for all the main partners,
inventories of wells and of pollution point sources, dissemination of real-time irrigation
requirements by crop, conversion of gravity to drip irrigation by water user associations,
and the development of shared data bases and analytical tools. A program of small grants
to local water user associations for improved irrigation and potable water systems has
also been developed.

Clearly, many of the specific activities contribute more than

tangentially to consistent and integrated water management, and may have important
impacts on the Souss-Massa resource base and economy, but space and time constraints
require a more pointed discussion. The focus of this paper will be on specific activities
and lessons learned that are more closely related to impact assessment and strategic
planning.
SIWM and Integrated Planning
As indicated above, there is no lack of long term planning and plans in Morocco.
However, it was clear in the Souss-Massa that coordination and planning at the regional
(river basin) level was not common. Agencies and water users focused only on their
portion of water-related activities. No one agency had an overall perspective. As would
be predicted by models of the political economy, water was used inefficiently, both as an
input and a waste sink. An initial analysis suggested that the partners needed to have
ways to share not only their official plans, but their concerns and their understanding of
the physical and economic system (Kent et aI., lQ99; Ouattar and Reiss, 2002). To that
end, a Regional Committee was formed under the SIWM project, composed of the
directors or other responsible representatives of regional entities with an interest in water
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management. These members included, of course, the new RBA, ONEP, RAMSA, and
ORMYA. However, other partners were also viewed as essential to integrated water
management. These included representatives from the Ministry of Environment (Cellule
environnement) and Office of Regional and Urban Planning (Inspection de l'Habitat),
Health, Natural Resources (Eaux et Forets), and elected representatives from the
Governor (Wilaya) and the Regional Council (Conseil Regional). The Regional
Committee would serve as the oversight for the project and also have a role in the Board
of Directors of the Agency, once it was firmly established and fully functional.
The new RBA was not established with a director and budget until April, 2002.
Thus, little could be accomplished within Component 1. However, the cooperative
planning efforts were begun with the formation of the first Interagency Technical
Working Group (IATWG). This group was charged with identifying, selecting and
designing the pilot projects ("real" or "concrete" activities as requested by the partners)
which would be implemented by SIWM. The IA TWG was composed of directors and
representatives of the partners, including the Director of the existing DRH. A total of six
pilot projects were identified, as described above. The process involved several months
of meetings and discussions among the partners. Once these pilot projects were
identified by the IATWG, specific technical working groups were formed, made up of
those partners directly involved with the projects.
The first pilot project to be implemented was the development of easily accessible
"harmonized" data bases. Each agency contributed to the data base, which was then
compiled and distributed on electronic media and through a new website
(http://\v\v\v.eau.lna). The website also contains significant information regarding water
use and conservation, water pricing, lists ofNGOs involved in water management, and
other topics. Transparent data sharing has been identified by many development workers
as a fundamental key to good management of all resources. However, achieving data
harmonization is seldom easy, since data are valuable commodities. Together with the
IATWG, the TWG formed around this pilot project helped established lines of
communication among the partners and the cooperative atmosphere on which SIWM
could base its support. The website and data bases has been visited well over 5,000 times
in the past 16 months, with the number of "hits" increasing at an average rate of over
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25% per month. Moreover, the telemetry data, which will be collected by the telemetry
pilot project facilities, will eventually be included in the databases accessible on the
website.
With the establishment of the new RBA in April, 2002, a study tour was provided
for the members of the Regional Committee (most of whom were also members of the
IATWG). This study tour had three objectives. The first was to demonstrate integrated
water management practices from the United States. The second was to introduce
strategic planning and management processes as practiced in the U.S. The third, and
probably most important, was to continue the inter-agency dialogue regarding water
issues and management in an atmosphere removed from everyday duties and conflicts
and with a focus on possible solutions to the problems faced in the Souss-Massa basin.
Evaluations of this study tour suggest that, far from being a perquisite for agency leaders,
it was highly successful in contributing to discussion and exchange among regional
managers who didn't normally interact on water issues.
Following the study tour, activities in Component 1 began in earnest. Consultants
were employed to examine the RBA and its organizational, financial, and training needs.
Preliminary reports outlined possible organizational structure (with organization charts
and manning documents), financial constraints and opportunities, and training needs in
accounting, human resource management, and communications. That activity continues
today, along with the development of an agency strategy and business, plan.
At the same time, efforts were begun to establish a strategic planning process at
the regional level, involving all the regional partners. Within the strategic planning
approach, several aspects of the legal and institutional situation were highlighted. First,
conversation with regional leaders reconfirmed the original impression of planning:
While strategic plans were developed with multiple agency input at the national level,
once those plans were in place there was little productive exchange at the regional level
among the partners. Second, the RBA by itself can not be expected to manage the water
resources of the basin unless its efforts are supported and coordinated with the partners.
Third, there is a lack of consideration of many of the available demand management tools
in all the plans directeurs and studies for most, if not all, of the agencies.
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The demand management proposed in these plans is based on technical
improvements (such as drip irrigation). Water consumers do pay for at least some of
their water in the Souss-Massa. ORMVA, ONEP and RAMSA all charge for water
which they deliver to end consumers. The costs are low and represent operation and
maintenance costs alone. The average urban charge (at current exchange rates) to
households and hotels for water delivered by RAMSA in Agadir is U.S.$0.28/m 3
($O.OOllgallon) for users consuming less than 24 m 3 (6,350 gal)/month, $0.76/m 3
($0.003/gal) from 25 to 60 m 3 (15,850 gal)/month, and $ 0.93/m3 ($.0035/gal) for users
consuming more than 60 m 3/month. Industrial users pay about $0.58/m 3 • The average
charge for (surface) irrigation water is approximately U.S.$0.05/m 3 ($62/acre foot).
Because neither urban nor irrigation rates include the capital cost of construction of dams,
urban charges frequently cover only 50% of the full cost of water and irrigation charges
ranges from 10% to 40% of the full cost of water. Private well owners do not currently
pay for water. There is an incentive to use groundwater for irrigation so long as pumping
costs do not exceed the surface water costs. The 1995 water law, when fully
implemented, will allow the Souss-Massa Basin agency to charge approximately
U.S.$0.002/m 3 ($2.501 acre foot) of groundwater pumped from private wells, but that

price is not likely to impact the decision to pump for most water users.
SIWM and Impact Assessment
One of the goals of impact assessment is to examine the consequences of
alternative actions. To take advantage of the shared data bases, facilities and training in
Geographic Information Systems were provided to the partners by SIWM. GIS coupled
with satellite imagery and interpretation, a part of the GIS training, has provided a basis
for looking at long term trends in cropping patterns in the Souss-Massa basin (Bouvier,
and Popescu, 2003). This analysis, completed as a part of partner training in GIS use,
suggests that citrus production has grown about 35% (approximately 6,500 hectares [haD
from 1984 to 2002, particularly in the zones east of Taroudant. It has also provided
estimations of the dramatic increase in vegetable production under plastic, particularly in
the Massa basin (from almost none to approximately 8,000 ha). (See Figures 2 and 3,
and Table 1). These increases in irrigated agriculture are only in a small part offset by
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reductions in the more traditional olive (about 300 ha) and field crop (about 800 ha)
production.

Souss-Massa, Morocco
1984 Agriculture Land-use

c:J Basin Boundary
-------.J Citrus 1984

c:J Green Houses 1984
c:J Olives 1984
c:J Field Crops 1984

Data Source: Landsat 1M

20

o

20 Kilometers

Acquisiton Date: 6'411984
Datum: WGS84
Reference System: UTM-29n
Produced by : DAI-GIS
Procudtion date: Mar, 2003

Figure 2. 1984 Cropping (Bouvier and Popescu, 2003)
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Souss-Massa, Morocco
2002 Agriculture Land-use

s

c=J Basin Boundary
-

Citrus 2002

c=J Green Houses 2002
CJ Olives 2002
c=J Field Crops 2002

20

o

20 Kilometers

Acquisiton Date: 6/18/2002
Datum : WGS84
Reference System : UTM-29n
Produced by: DAI-GIS
Procudtion date: Mar, 2003

~~~~~~

Figure 3. 2002 Cropping (Bouvier and Popescu, 2003)
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The same study also focused on an area (Guerdane region) in which the aquifer
has been depleted and citrus plantations have been abandoned or are under water stress
(over 100 ha-Figure 4). It is clear that continued overdrafting of the aquifer will
accelerate the problem. However, the AbH and ORMYA are developing plans to
mitigate the problem using a canal to transport surface storage to the area under a plan
developed in part with the support of the World Bank. Unfortunately, the impact of this
transfer on existing users and resources has not been reported.

if'

'"

Crop Area (ha)
Citrus - 1984
Citrus - 2002
Greenhouse 1984
Greenhouse 2002
Olives 1984
Olives 2002
Wield Crops 1984
Wield Crops 2002

Sum
Count
21,514.43 1,766.00
28,040.92 2,926.00
15.30

10.00

7,986.58 1,332.00
595.06
329.00
321.34
494.00
1,925.69 2,117.00
1,143.55 1,068.00

Table 1. Tabular Statistical Results (area estimates derived from the vector shape files
and do not include transitional citrus) (Bouvier and Popescu, 2003)

An allocation model based on water requirements for agriculture and

municipal/industrial water was developed, and REA personnel were provided with
software for and training in ModFlow, a finite difference groundwater model currently
used world-wide for managing aquifers. The next steps in this activity are to verify the
ModFlow models for the Souss and Massa aquifers, expand the allocation model to
include economic allocation criteria, and link the groundwater models to the improved
allocation model(s). The databases, GIS, and modeling tools have provided, and will
continue to provide, the partners with the ability to analyze the impacts-physical and
economic---{)f alternative plans and policies.
Environmental concerns were the principle force behind the implementation of
impact assessment. SIWM's involvement with the environment (other than groundwater
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Guerdane Region - June 2002.
Figure 3. Citrus Production in Guerdane region, south of Taroudant. The
black box denotes significant region of change in citrus area (features in
deep red indicates citrus area) (Bouvier and Popescu, 2003)
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depletion) are two-fold. First, the RBA was given the responsibility for identifying water
pollution. One of the SIWM pilot projects has the objective of inventorying point
sources of pollution in the Souss-Massa. The results of this inventory will become part of
the data bases available to all the partners electronically. This project is just beginning,
with the main funding for the survey coming from the Agency budget.
The second activity is related to the coastal zone component of the project.
Clearly, pollution of marine waters, especially from untreated urban wastewater and
commercial activities along the coast, is a major issue. However, the pollution of fresh
water aquifers through salt intrusion is also a critical problem, since many-if not most-of
the tourist hotels along the beaches of Agadir use wells as a major source of fresh water.
An important institutional constraint to managing water in the coastal zone is the lack of

clear authority and responsibility. Once again, there are multiple agencies and groups
who impact the coastal zone, and water management must be a coordinated effort. A
Coastal Zone Technical Working Group was formed shortly after the new component
was added to SIWM's tasks. That group has been involved in identifying several of the
key issues facing water managers. SIWM is developing two specific actions in the near
term. The first is a study tour by members of technical working group to coastal
management sites in the United States. One of the primary objectives of this tour is to
observe the governance issues and problems which have developed in the US, and the
alternative solutions which have been tried. A second objective is to demonstrate specific
technical tools to meet the management challenges, including using treated waste water,
desalinization, and various management models (some based in GIS). The third objective
is to encourage dialogue among the members of the technical working group, much like
the initial integrated water management study tour.
The second action is the organization of a symposium at which technical at
governance issues will be discussed, and recommendations made to the Government of
Morocco relative to solutions to coastal zone problems in the Souss-Massa. Once again,
the technical working group will playa pivotal role in this symposium.
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SIWM in Perspective
The SIWM project was undertaken to help reduce the lack of consistent water
management in Morocco. Major impediments to integrated management included:
•

single-focus agencies working a cross-purpose,

•

political barriers to change,

•

a divergence of understanding of critical water issues among agencies, users,
and the public,

•

a seeming disregard for broad approaches to demand management,

•

a lack of regional solutions to regional problems,

•

limited capacity of small farmers to adapt to water shortages,

•

and an apparent absence of communications across water managers at the
regional and local levels.

The SIWM project is still a work in progress. However, the project has already
demonstrated several issues in integrating planning and management:
•

First, adequate data, data sharing and transparency are all essential to real
integrated management. Without transparent and available data, assessments
of the impacts of policy changes are not likely to be accurate or accepted.
Data are crucial to resource management.

•

Second, data alone are not sufficient. Tools which use those data must be
present so that decision-makers can evaluate effects and results. Moreover,
these tools themselves must be accepted widely and results must be
understandable.

•

Third, communication among decision-makers, both government and private,
who deal with the resource or policy must be not only possible, but expected.
Approaches which establish lines of communication, mutual interest, and trust
must be sought.

•

Finally, integrated water management will be successful only when all actors
can be involved in assessing the impacts of alternative policies and choosing
appropriate solutions.
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